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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
EAST BENCH IRRIGATION CO.,
et al.
Respondents,

vs.

No. 7990

STATE OF UTAH, et al.
Appellants.

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The importance of the decision of the Court to be
rendered in this case, must be apparent. The large number of parties involved, the huge investments and expend.i.:
tures at stake, and the fact that the decision in this case
will be far-reaching and may affect litigation upon other
rivers within the State of Utah, cannot be overemphasized. This Court has recognized the importance
of the case and the issues involved when it acted upon
the suggestion that it traverse the Sevier River and visualize the physical conditions existing on the stream and
properties which will be affected by the final determination.
If the respondents are able to succeed in sustaining
the decree appealed from, the appellants urge that we
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will have in U tab an entirely ne'v concept of 'vater law,
adjudicated water rights on major rivers of the State
will be jeopardized, and the status of such adjudicated
rights will be thrown into helpless confusion.
Appellants have endeavored by their answer to the
respondents' contentions as set forth in this reply brief
to aid this Court in determining what are the real and
important issues to be decided, and to place such issues
in their proper perspective.
As nearly as we can determine from respondents'
brief, they seek to sustain the judgment of the trial court
on three· grounds :
1. (A) That the appellants have no vested right
in the return flow of the Sevier River, or in the waters
going to make up the return flow, so that they can have
no valid objection to respondents converting a direct flow
winter right to a storage right for later irrigation, and
that appellants have no right to a continuation of the
conditions which existed on the stream at the tin1e their
appropriations were made. (Pages 7, 17, 19, 41, 57, 72, 75,
92, 128 and 139 respondents' brief)
(B) That all waters passing the Kingston Gauging Station, which have been decreed to the respondents, have come to the appellants gratuitously from the
respondents or as waste water as a result of disastrous
conditions upstream and particularly that the appellant
storage con1panies have no vested rights in any winter
flow at the Kingston Gauging Station. ·(Page 7 respondents' brief)
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2. That appellants would still get their water by
reason of the saving of 30,000 acre feet of water which
annually wastes by evaporation on 10,000 acres of waterlogged lands belonging to respondents. (Pages 9 and 10
respondents' brief)
3. That even though the water is taken from appellants and given to respondents, appellants could not
be hurt because the amount taken is so small in relation
to the whole. (Page 10 respondents' brief)
Wholly aside from the n1ain contention of the
respondents, the preliminary statement contains several
glaring misstatements of fact. At page 8 of respondents'
brief is contained this statement:
"In approving the change applications, the
district court fully protected the rights of defendants by the conditions specified in the judgment.
By the express terms of the judgment approving
the change applications, the court requires the
plaintiffs to allow the same quantity of water to
pass the Kingston measuring station in the future
as has passed that station in prior comparable
years of similar conditions of water shed, snow
cover, rainfall, infiltration runoff, te1nperature,
and other pertinent factors so that the yield of
the river at Kingston will be the same as if no
change applications had been approved, except
that the court does not require the plantiffs to
send down the river to Kingston any water gratuitously or as waste water."
'rhe above statement is not in accordance with fact.
What the court did was to permit the respondents to
store the entire flow of the river at Hatch up to 74 sec-
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ond feet during the period from November 15th to ~farch
15th of each year with the only provision being that during the time of such storage, respondents \Vere not also
to use a like quantity for irrigation.
lA. THE APPELLANTS HAVE A VESTED RIGHT IN
THE RETURN FLOW AND TO THE CONTINUANCE OF
THE CONDITIONS WHICH RESULT IN SUCH RETURN
FLOW.

At page 92 of their brief respondents state that:
"The Cox decree does not give any of the
appellants any vested right in the return flo"~
resulting from the method of irrigation by plaintiffs and the statement on page 51 (of appellants
brief) that 'the lower users have a vested right
which compels the continuation of the past practices of respondents using the water and not storing or holding it up' is not based on any language
of the Cox decree. Such statement is also contrary
to law." (Emphasis added)
This question of whether or not the appellants have a
vested right in the return flow or carrier water resulting
from the lTSE of respondents winter rights upon their
lands, is one of the fundamental issues of law at stake
in this case. The Trial Court erroneously decided that
the appellants did not have any vested right in such
return flow and thus gave judicial sanction to respondents' clairn that they could take both their decreed stunrner and winter water rights "and such water rnay be
taken in a bucket and dumped into the Colorado RivPr"
if respondents so decided.
The decreed rights as provided in the ( iox deeree
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exceed the flo\v of the Sevier 1-\iver at any one point a
hundred fold. Everyone living along the Sevier River is
well a.\vare of the fact that at many places there are tight
darns across the river which divert the entire flow of the
river into a canal and that for a short distance below
such darn, the river is completely dry. Thus it is obvious
that each 'vater user is entirely dependent for his source
of supply upon the return flow of the upper user. If this
Court should lend any credence to the argun1ent that a
lower user does not have a vested right in such return
flo\v and in a continuation of the conditions which produce such return flow then the lower users' decreed right
will be \vorthless. The principle of return flow is responsible for the utilization of the waters of the Sevier
River over and over again.
When the respondents argue that appellants have no
vested right in the return flow of the Sevier River, it is
equivalent to their admitting that the change applications
will result in adversely affecting the rights of the lower
users, because it is obvious that if respondents \vere sure
that the record is clear and satisfactory, and this Court
would be convinced thereby that appellants could not be
injured by these change applications either through
dilninishing the amount of water which theretofore had
reached appellants, or changing the time element of the
return flow, then respondents need not so laboriously
argue that the appellants have no vested right to a continuance of the return flow.
The respondents say in effect that since the appellants have no vested right to a continuation of the return
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flow as it is now and has heretofore existed, they can
do as they please with the water, "carry it away in
buckets" or otherwise dispose of it. If respondents are
serious about this contention and expect this Court to
adopt this.new concept of water law, then why all of their
lengthy and reiterated statements set forth in their brief
that appellants· cannot suffer any injury, but that the
storage of water in the Hatchtown Reservoir will pass
more water down through the Kingston gauging station
than under present conditions.
Th~

rights of appropriators along the entire length
of the Sevier River, excepting at the extreme headwaters
thereof, are dependent upon return flow-more so than
on any other stream within the State so far as we have
been able to determine. Defendants' Ex. 54, is a lTnited
States Geological Survey Water-Supply Paper, and has
been compiled after years of study. Concerning the
Sevier River and its water supply, at pages 68 and 69
is found the following statement:
·"It was apparent soon after the irrigation
use of the Sevier began that much of the water
diverted from the stream and applied to contiguous land soon found its way back into the
river .. This fact is of prime importance, to the
users of the stream because the return water is
available for rediversion at places lower down the
river. So 1na.rked is this tendency to return seepage that not far below several tight dams that
divert the entire flow of the river at its normal
state the river carries nearly as much water, and
in some instances fully as tnuch as it does above
the dams. Tlus has at tin1es reversed the general
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rule that the upper irrigators on a stream have
the best water supply, for a number of canals
belo\v points 'vhere large diversions are made
have a water supply from return flow that can
be materially decreased only by diverting the
water above to another watershed or to land so
remote as to change the regimen of tha.t flow. On
the other hand, it has complicated water rights.
along the stream, because it results in no known
quantity of water to be divided along those
stretches of river between the gauging stations.
The present ~irrigation practice, however, by yea,rs
of application under natural drainage conditions,
has brought abo~tt a divertible water-supply yiel.d
along the river greatly in excess of the observed
flow at the gauging stations. This is not only true
of the river as whole but is generally true of all
e~cept one of the respective stretches between the
gauging stations." (Italics ours)
_..,..,.,,.

lB. THE APPELLANTS HAVE AN ABSOLUTE RIGH'T
THAT THE WATERS PASSING KINGSTON GAUGING STATION CONTINUE TO DO SO AT THE TIME AND IN THE
QUANTITY AS IN PAST YEARS. THE SO-CALLED WINTER WATER PASSING THE KINGSTON STATION IS THE
VERY SUBSTANCE OF THE STORAGE RIGHTS OF PIUTE
AND SEVIER BRIDGE RESERVOIRS.

The court apparently took the position that there
could be no vested rights, upon the part of the appellant ·
storage companies, in winter water. Respondents took
the position that this so-called winter right, which they
have never used in the past has gone to the lower users
gratuitously. Respondents, by their own testimony
(Plaintiffs' Ex. G, reproduced at page 20-21 of Appellant's Brief) show that for the ten year period of 1940
to 1949, inclusive, during the months of October, N ovem-
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ber, December, January, February, March and April, the
· flow of the river at Kingston greatly exceeds the flow
at Hatch and during the months of May, June, July,
August and September, the flow at Hatch greatly exceeds
the flow at Kingston. The same condition has existed
for many years. (Defendants Ex. 54, Flow at Hatch,
pages 217-220; Flow at Kingston, pages 225-229.) The
decreased flow at Kingston coincides exactly with the
irrigation season and the increased flow at Kingston
coincides exactly with the non-irrigation season, as such
seasons generally occur within the State of Utah.
We believe that it is proper for this Court, in this
present action, to take judicial notice of the fact that
the only. winter irrigation which occurs in th~ high
altitude of the irrigated lands of Utah is done from
the witness chair and not in actual practice. This Court is
no more bound by such statements than it would be bound
if some witness should state that the sun shown on a
certain spot in Utah continuously for a twenty-four hour
period. Each of the members of this Court has lived
within the State of Utah for many years and has had the
opportunity to observe irrigation p·ractices within this
state, and we venture the statement without fear of contradiction that no member of this Court has ever observed
or known of any farmer irrigating continuously and
regularly during the winter months-particularly at a
point where the elevation is approximately six thousand
feet and the night time temperatures frequently reach
the upper 20's below zero. An upper water user is not
gratuitously giving water to another which he cannot
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divert from the strean1 al)d put to any ben~ficial use f~r
irrigation purposes, particularly when the practice haa
gone on for n1ore than eighty years continuously, and the
lower user along the strear~~:_ has appropriated, stor~~
and used the water for a long period of time. This is
true even tho some court decree has previonsiy award~d
the water to an upper user.
The only way in which winter water can be "Qene- ·
ficially used for irrigation purposes in this altitude is to
store the same in a reservoir during the winter months
and use it for irrigation purposes during the gro,ving
season. The respondents say, in effect, that for the past
eighty years they have permitted this water to flow down
to the lower users in the winter time but that during all
of such tin1e it was a mere gift to such lower users, in
which they could acquire no rights -by appropriation or
otherwise because the water belonged absolutely to
respondents; that now respondents desire to construct a
reservoir and use this water; that they have a right to
do this for the reason they are the absolute owners of
the water and may· do with it what they please; that even
tho they could make no beneficial use of the water themselves they could hold the ownership of it indefinitely
and at any time construct a reservoir so that they could
then use it; that they could construct this reservoir and
deprive the lower users of the use of the water even tho
such lower users have appropriated, stored and used
the water continuously for irrigation p-urposes. for more
than thirty years last past.
Such a contention is not the law in the State of Utah.
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The appropriator acquires only the right to the USE of
water, and he acquires no rights in any water which he
cannot and does not beneficially use. Were this not the
fact there could have been no irrigation development
within the State of Utah, because all of the early decrees
awarded to small groups the use of waters on a stream
far in excess of their actual needs, and if they had
actually owned the water, a small group on any streau1
could have prevented any further development along
that stream. But even if the upper appropriators had'
actually owned the water they could not have done what
the respondents are now seeking to do. The doctrine of
Equitable Estoppel would have prevented the1n fron1 taking back the water which they have allowed others to use
over a long period of time for the development of agricultural lands and the establishment of fanns, homes and
communities.
The chief argument of respondents in support of their
position is that the appellant storage companies have no
vested rights whatever in any winter flow of water for
storage purposes, and that they have only a vested right
to such water as may accumulate in their reservoirs at
the sufferance of the direct flow users. This argu1nent
i:s repeated again and again. What the respondents
choose to overlook is the fact that the storage rights and
the primary rights are predicated upon and awarded by
the sa1ne decree, and upon the sa1ne stipulation of the
parties upon which the decree was based. The storage
filings of the appellant reservoir co1npanies as stated in
the decree, and as a matter of law, have the sa1ne dignity
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as direct flow rights. The trial court apparently took the
position that a 'vater filing and a decree of the court confirming it, for the purpose of storing the direct flow of
the river in a reservoir, does not constitute a vested
right, and that the upper users could diminish the flow
of the river by the construction of a reservoir and
impounding a portion of that flow therein without in
any 1uanner interfering with the vested rights of the
lo,ver storage co1npanies. The trial court admitted in his
memorandum of decision that this reasoning was weak
(R. 1121), 'vhich admission is certainly a classic understatement. To hold that vested rights can be acquired in
the flow of a strea1n for use of the waters thereof by
direct diversion but that no vested right can be acquired
in the flow of a 'Stream by appropriating the same for
storage in a reservoir during the winter months for the
purpose of irrigation during the irrigating season, leads
to an absurdity. Especially is this true when we take
into consideration the nature of the direct diversion of
appellants, particularly along the Sevier River. The
direct apropriator merely selected some suitable site on
the river and f~lled a couple of cottonwood trees across
the strean1, hauling a few loads of rock, and dumping
the sarne behind the felled trees and thus diverted the
water into his canals. This type of diversion of the direct
flow rights is still common along the Sevier River and
until recent years was a universal method of diversion.
The storage cornpanies were required to 'Spend huge
sun•~ of rnoney, running into the millions of dollars, in
order to construct the reservoirs required to impound
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and divert the water. What the reservoir companies
appropriated by their filings was not such 'vater as
might accumulate in the reservoir, but a definite quantity
of water flowing
second feet to be impounded in the
reservoirs so constructed. ·The holding of the trial court
and the argument. of respondents, to the effect that an
upper user may not, by the construction of a reservoir
diminish the flo'v of \Vater that the lower primary or
direct flow users have received for a long period of time,
but that they can, by the construction of such reservoir,
and with impunity, diminish the flow of the river which
the storage companies have received for a similar period
of tin1e, is not based upon any :sound reasoning. Any
judgment based upon weak reasoning or unsound .principles invariably results in bad law which sooner or later
1nust he reversed. Under the statutes of Utah and the
prior decisions of this Court, each type of appropriation,
both direct flow and storage, have equal dignity and
there is no rhyme or reason to the argument that the
storage rights can be interfered with and diminished but
that the direct flow rights cannot.

in

The rights ot the owners of the Piute Reservoir and
the owners of the Sevier Bridge Reservoir are set forth
under their specific filings and applications which appear
on Pages 185 and 186 of the Cox Decree. These rights
are specifically !set forth on Page 185 of the Decree as
follows:
~'It

is further ordered, adjudged and decreed
that the l"liute Reservoir and Irrigation Co1npany,
a corporation, State Board of I.Jand Con1n1is-
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s1oners of the State of Utah, (herein called the
o'vners of Piute R-eservoir) ; and the Abraham
Irrigation Con1pany, a corporation, Deseret Irri-·
gation Co1npa.ny, a corporation, Delta Canal Company, a corporation, Central Utah Water Company, a corporation, and Melville Irrigation Company; a corporation, (herein called the owners of
the Sevier Bridge Reservoir), are the owners of
the right to store and use all of the waters yielded
by the said Sevier River for sati:sfying their
rights under applications designated as No-. 296,
1nade ~{arch 14, 1905; No. 1534, made A1:1gust 16,
.1907; and No. 1624, made October 21, 1907; in the
office of the State Engineer of the State of Utah
and under the so-called Hawley Filing made by
Jacob C. Hawley on August 26, 1902, and under
applications to appropriate water designated as
No. 1367 A, made May 10, 1907; No. 1367 A-1,
made ~fay 10, 1907; and No. 4562, made ~larch 19,
1912 ; in the office of the State Engineer of the
State of Utah."
At page 71 of their brief, respondents pounce upon
a "catch-all" phrase in the Cox Decree, appearing at page
195 thereof, and treat that as the sole rights of the
storage companies. Naturally any water captured and
held in the Sevier Bridge Reservoir and the Piute Reservoir which otherwise would have gone to waste, belongs
to these companies, but in addition to that they do have
definite and specific rights herein shown, and respondents
are no more entitled to diminish those rights by the construction of the Hatchtown Reservoir than they are
entitled to diminish the rights of the lower direct flow
users. Respondents state at page 71 of their brief as·
follows:
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"The decree refers to water in excess of pri
mary rights. It does not refer to consumptive use
of water, nor does it purport to vest in the reservoir companies any 'water in excess of consump
tive use' made by the respondents."
4

4

and imply therefron1 in their argument that they may at
this late date, to the· detriment of the storage co1npanies,
change their winter rights from a non-consumptive use
to a consumptive use. Had the decree made such a pro~
vision it would have been invalid as contrary to public
policy and would have been contrary to the well estab
lished law that a prior appropriator cannot change his
use from a non-consumptive use to a consun1ptive use to
the detriment of a subsequent appropriator. Certainly
it could not be argued that any of the power companies
"\vhich have now appropriated water for the purpose of
generating electric power, could, if atomic power or son1e
other cheaper means of power should be discovered and
developed, change their non-consumptive power use to
a consumptive use for agricultural purposes, depriving
the lower users on the stream of these same 'vaters 'vhich
the lower users have appropriated for irrigation pur
poses. But that is exactly what respondents try to argue
in the present case. It was established beyond any question of a doubt that the present and past usage of the
'vinter waters by the respondents has been lin1ited in
scope, and the use has been largely non-consumptive;
that after the diversion, the water returned to the natural
channel of the Sevier River practically undiiuinished and
flowed do,vn to make up the storage rights of appellants
who have appropriated and used the sa1ne for n1ore than
4

4
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thirty years last past for agricultural purposes. Respondents claim the right to change this use of water from a
non-consu1nptive to a consumptive use by storing such
winter waters in the proposed Hatch Reservoir and
using the same during the summer months on the five
thousand acres of additional land where the waters will
be practically all consumed. If such a doctrine should be
upheld, then the power companies in the west, if some
additional source of power were developed, could compel
the 'vater users within such areas to repurchase their
water rights from the power companies or be deprived
of water which they had, for generations, appropriated
and used for agricultural purposes.
Even if the whole source of supply of the reservoir
companies was based upon the "catch-all" phrase in the
Cox Decre·e, it would offer no help to respondents because
the word "accumulation," as used in the Cox Decree, has
been defined by this Court in the case of Richlands I rr.
Co. vs. Westview Irr. Co., et al., 96 Utah 403, 80 Pac. 2nd
458. This Honorable Court defined the word accumulate
as follows:
"We must judicially know that the water in a
river between any two points is not accumulated
there solely from the contributions thereto from
marginal sources, but that the major portion
thereof comes by natural flow from upstream
sources which have fed the channel itself, step by
step, clear back to its ultimate source or sources.
The entire watershed to its uttermost confines,
covering thousands of square miles, out to the
crest of the divides which separate it from adja-
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cent watersheds, is the generating source from
which the water of a river comes or accumulates
in its channel. Rains and snows falling on this
entire vast area sink into the soil and find their
way by surface or underground flow or percolation through the sloping strata down to the central channel. This entire sheet of water, or water
table, constitutes the river and it never ceases to
be such in its centripetal motion toward the channel. Any appropriator of water from the eentral
channel is entitled to rely and depend upon all
the sources which feed the main stream above his
own diversion point, clear back to the farthest
· limits of the watershed.
"Webster's definitions of 'accumulate' as
meaning 'to heap up in a mas'S; to pile up; collect
or bring together; to amass; gather, store up,
aggregate, hoard', etc., imply no restriction as to
the source, means or methods of the accumulation.
A fruit tree accumulates water and nourishment
from the earth by means of every one of its
thousands of roots and rootlets spreading in
every direction, and every apple or peach on the
tree i's an accumulation or reservoir of that moisture and nutrition, owing naught to any one
source n1ore than to another. The whole crop of
fruit on each tree is the 'yield' of that tree. The
entire yield of an orchard is the 'accumulation' of
moisture and nourishment taken by all the trees
from the ground by all (not merely some) of the
roots which tap the source of supply in the ground
covered by the orchard. The same principle applies to a field of grain nourished, produced and
yielded by. all its individual stalks and myriads of
r~ots and rootlets which suck up moisture and
~utrition from the ground. Every one of its root.s
are a point of contact with the source of supply,
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not merely some of t:P.em, or those near the
margin of the field."
Respondents contend (page 51 of their brief) tP.at
the cases of Lasso·n vs. Seely, (Utah ~951) ~38 Pac. 2nd
418, and Srnithfield West Bench Irr. Co. vs. Union Cenr
tral Life Ins. Co., 105 Utah 468, 142 Pac. 2nd 866, dispose of the arguments and claims of the ~ppellants. If
the facts in the case at bar were comparable, and if the
legal principles relied upon by respondents. to sustain
their position were the same and the only legal principles
involved in this case, there would be merit in such contention. On Pages 49, 50 and 51 of the appellants' brief,
appellants distinguish between the factual situation and
legal principles involved in these two cases and the case
at bar, the principle distinguishing feature being that
the above two cases concerned summertime practices and
waters which were awarded the litigants for :summer use.
There was not involved in either of these cases the prob·
lem · o~ conversion of direct flow winte~· water into
storage rights. The waste water referred to in the L·asson and West Bench cases was water discharged as waste
out of waters used on land during the times for which
the appropriators were awarded the use thereof. In
other words, an appropriator having a vested right to
the use of water during certain summer months· may prevent waste water from leaving his premises and may
re-use it during such summer months, but we have. found
no case or authority holding that an appropriator may,
as against lower and junior. appropriators, hold. water
.

'

'

.,

which he cannot beneficially use during the period for
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which the use was awarded, for the use at some future
time outside the period for which the use was awarded,
and particularly for use during a period when the appropriator has another and additional water right for the
same. premises. Put another way, if the respondents
desire to prevent what they call waste water, (fro1n and
out of their winter water), from leaving their premises,
and can beneficially re-use it on their premises during
such winter months, the doctrine announced in the cases
relied on by respondents might be urged with greater
force.
It is true that in the Smithfield West Ben.ch case the
Court states in its decision "while in his ditch or upon
his land it (the water) was his property and he could USi
it as he saw fit. When the water reaches the lower end
of his land, he may again gather it into a ditch and convey it to any other land, ditch or reservoir." Obviously,
if the appropriator gathered the water into a ditch or
canal, it would be re-used immediately and not held for
storage until the following year or even until the following weeks or months. When the Court stated "he
may again gather it and convey it to a reservoir," we
are convinced the Court did not have in mind a reservoir
such as that contemplated by respondents-1niles upstreal? from the place where the premises to be irrigated
are located, nor did the Court have in mind impow1ding
what "might be" waste water before the water is even
used, let alone, wasted-nor impounding water a\varded
for winter use to be used months thereafter during smnmer irrigation.
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And while the concurring opinion of :hfr. Chief Justice
'Volfe in the case of Lassou vs. Seely, supra, states "the
defendant is entitled to cultivate his own lands in such
a manner as to utilize the water to which he is entitled,"
it is assun1ed that the \Vater was going to be utilized
during the period for which it was awarded, and in the
mann.er and for the purpose for which it was awarded.
Certainly the language used by Chief Justice Wolfe is
not to be interpreted as meaning the. water could be
utilized without any limitation as to time of future use,
or manner thereof, for a purpose different from that for
which it was awarded. (It should be borne in mind that
respondents justify the award for winter use for the
purpose of "storing water in the ground, to take the frost
out of the ground, to produce early feed, to wash out the
alkali and also for culinary and stockwatering"). (See
pages 35 and 59 of respondents' brief.)
It was further stated by Chief Justice Wolfe "the
decree does not compel any upper appropriator to waste
water nor to leave a surplus of water to drain into the
slough. Nor could the decree direct the upper ·appropriators as to how they should utilize the waters which
they are entitled to use." But this language from which
the respondents derive such comfort, applies to the
circumstances and actual situation then before the Court.
The Cox Decree sets forth during what period the
respondents shall have their winter water and it certainly implies a use of the water during that period, not
six months later.
Respondents' entire theory seems to be that they
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want to impound in the proposed Batchtown Reservoir
water which they designate as "waste" or "gratuitous"
water. This so-called waste or gratuitous water is largely
water which heretofore respondents have either permitted to come down the river channel in the winter
months when they had no use therefor, or water which
they have run over their lands, and having little or no
consumptive use, immediately found its way back into
the channel. This kind or class of water is not "waste"
water as that term is understood and intended when
subject to co1nment or discussion by the courts. It
is a n1isnon1er to call it "waste water," or water
"gratuitously" given up. It is water which the respondents cannot beneficially use and they cannot hold back,
notwithstanding the decree awards to them a specific
amount of water. Appellants have no objection, and
offer none, to respondents holding this water on their
lands, if they can, for use or re-use during the winter
months. As a matter of fact respondents have never
gratuitously permitted the water to leave their lands
when they' could hold and use it. What respondents seek
to do is impound what they call "waste" water before it
is even used in the first instance and before it becotnes
"wasted", and to impound what they are pleased to call
"gratuitous" 'vater before it even reaches their premises.
The Cox Decree certainly never intended any such
result, and it cannot be said that when the parties stipulated the Cox Decree they had any such changed conditions in mind.
At pages 86, 87 and 88 of respondents' brief, they
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complain that the appellants want to go back of the Cox
decree when referring to the proposed determination
(Ex. 52), copies of water claims filed by plaintiffs upon
which the proposed detern1ination was largely formulated (Ex. 53) and negotiations of the parties prior to
the decree (R. 857-858-891), to reduce the water rights
of respondents. They cite the case of Richlands Irrigation Co. vs. Westview Irrigation Co. et al., 96 Utah 403,
80 P~c. 2nd 458, as authority for their position. It is
true that this Court held in such case "when all parties
agree on the rights of the claimant and stipulate that a
decree may be entered in conformity thereto, the objection does not lie that the relief given exceeds the statement of claim." The Court actually held in that ~ase that
water users' claims previously filed were not controlling
when contrary to. the stipulation and decree. But it
appears conclusively that the stipulation in question
expressly provided for use of water from Jan. 1st to
Dec. 31st of each year, and there was no room for interpretation. But when a decree is stipulated· and t}:le
parties are divided as to the interl;lretation of a portion
or portions thereof, or as to what the decreed and vested
rights are, and ther~ exists possible uncertainty as to
the construction which should be given to ~he disputed
portions, then the court should look · to the proposed
determination, water users' claims theretofore filed and
any other extrinsic evidence available. As examples of
divergent views of the litigants as to correct interpTetation of the decree:
(Page 66 respondents' brief where it is said) :
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''The decree appealed fron1 will be searched in
vain for any 'definition and determination' of
the vested rights of any of the parties."
(Page 92 respondents' brief where it is said):
"Contrary to the argmnent on page 53 (appellants' brief) the Cox decree does not give any of
appellants any vested right in the return f}o,v,
etc."
We call attention to the case of Smithfield West BencJt
lrr. Co. vs. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 113 Utah 356,
195 Pac. 2nd 249, wherein it is held "A stipulation
entered into by parties to suit must be construed in
light of the situation at the time of its execution."
Respondents' second contention is, namely, that apellants will not be injured by the construction of the Hatchtown Reservoir and the impounding therein of 'vaters
which has otherwise gone to the appellants, for the
reason that there will be a saving of 30,000 acre feet of
water now \vasted by evaporation on 10,000 acres of
waterlogged lands. They contend these savings 'vill go
to appellants and thus more than offset any losses which
they would sustain by reason of the construction of the
Hatchtown Reservoir and the impounding of the "'inter
and early spring flow therein which has heretofore gone
down to the appellant storage companies. This is an
argument that respondents dwell upon at great lengthone that they really love, for in their brief they havP
repeated it in detail no fewer than sixteen ti1nes. The
argument appears at pages 9, 10, 22, 23, 29, 30, 33, 37~
53, 54, 62, 64, 73, 77, 78, 125, 132, and 134. They evidently
believe in· the late Adolph Hitler's theory, that if you
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repeat a falsehood often enough it will eventually be
accepted as the truth.
It must be remembered that these applications do
not seek to abandon the use of the water on any of the
waterlogged lands and apply the same on new lands.
What twenty of these applications are designed to do is
to hold back the application of water on these waterlogged lands in 'vinter months and the early spring when
evaporation is at a minimum and apply the same
quantity of water on the same waterlogged lands later
in the season when evaporation losses are at a maximum.
The other applications are designed to use a portion of
the early spring and late fall rights for the irrigation of
five thousand acres of entirely new land. Respondents
desire to store winter and early spring flow, which they
do not need and for which they have heretofore made
no claim, for irrigation purposes on this new land. Thus,
in effect, they will use their present supply for the irrigation of the new lands and use the stored water on their
present waterlogged lands in the heat of the summer
when the rate of evaporation is at its maximum. The
change applications, if allowed, thus would increase,
rather than decrease, the loss by evaporation on the
10,000 acres of water-logged lands.
It is probably true, as stated by Dr. Israelson, that
a considerable saving in water could be made in evaporation losses and otherwise, if proper farming and irrigation practices were followed, that is, if the waterlogged
lands were drained and the present vegetation was destroyed and the lands were then planted to tame grasses
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and forage, il.nd then irrigated with sUfficient water to
supply the tame grasses and forage. It is a theory that
has some interesting possibilities, but the trouble with
the situation is that it is only theory and not a practice.
There is not, in the decree of the trial court, a single
requirement that any of the respondents use a single
acre foot iess water on the waterlogged lands than they
have used on such lands in_the past. There is no requirement providing for the drainage of even a single acre
of the 10,000 acres of waterlogged lands and there is
absolutely no limitation placed upon the quantity of
water that can be used on such waterlogged ·lands. Had
the decree provided that re~pondents must drain these
10,000 waterlogged. acres, then plant them to tame
grass-es and forage and limit the amount of water 'vhich
c.ould then be applied
the maximum needs of such
tame grasses, the respondents would have loudly and
violently objected to such provisions. Such waterlogged
lands are meadow lands and produce ' an abundance of
native yegetation, and used by respo~dents for grazing
purposes. It is true that this type of native vegetation
~s not the most efficient insofar as the acreage yield is
concerned. It is not, as Dr. Israelson stated, of the
highest palatability for livestock but it is nevertheless
of sufficient palatability so that cattle thrive on it, raise
their calves, and gain back the loss of weight suffered
during th~. wint~r months. These waterlogged lands
are in reality meadow lands and form t}.l.e very basis of
respondents' livestock industry, and no doubt furnish
them a higher net return for investment and labor tltan

to

.
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any other lands used by then1 for farming and raising
of livestock.
The last thing on this earth that respondents desire,
is to have these meadow or waterlogged grass lands
drained, "\Vith the requirement that SUCh acreage be
planted and irrigated as farm lands. This is clearly
demonstrated by the fact that there wa.s a public offer
made by the United State Army Engineers, a branch of
the United States Government, (of which offer this
Court 1nay take judicial notice), to go into the lower end
of Circle alley and without expense to the respondents
deepen the natural channel of the s.evier River from a
point below the Kingston Gauging Station to a point
above the Town of Circleville. This deepening of the
natural channel of the Sevier River would have had the
effect of naturally draining several thousand acres of
this so-called waterlogged land. The people of Circleville, in no uncertain terms, turned down the proffer of
the United States Army Engineers, even though the
entire cost of the project would have been borne by the
Federal Government.

'r

If respondents are at all sincere in their contention
that the construction of the Hatchtown Reservoir would
result in the saving of 30,000 acre feet of water now
entirely lost by evaporation, they would have suggested
to the court a provision in the decree to the effect:
"that storage, diversion or use of the waters
referred to in such applications shall be so con.
trolled that in each calendar month the flow of
the South Fork of the Sevier River past the
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Kingston gauging station shall be in that quantity
of water which would have passed such station
in the same calendar month had there been no
storage, diversion or use within said applications."
Certainly, in all fairness, respondents should have
had no objection to the same formula being applied to
the water measured at the Kingston gauging station in
the non-irrigating season as is applied during the irrigating season. They should have had no valid objection
to having the same formula applied with respect to the
vested rights of the primary users and storage users
below the Kingston gauging station. The saving of
30,000 acre feet of water would be sufficient to fill the
proposed reservoir more than two and a half times and
that saving alone would provide respondents with a
fairly adequate water supply on their limited acres of
farm land for the short growing season which exists at
Circleville and Panguitch. Particularly this would be
true, if the situation is as stated by respondents in their
brief (page 54), as follows:
"Even if the figure of 13,000 acre feet used
by the appellants 'vere accepted as the a1nount of
water which would be consumptively used on the
5000 acres (including the amount lost by evaporation plus the loss in transit) there would still lw
a surplus of approximately 17,000 acre feet rPsulting from the more efficient use of water by
virtue of changing the place of use."
The only trouble with the above quotation i8 that
the applications do not seek to change the place of use.
There is no requirement that respondents cease watering
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any of the presently 'vaterlogged lands as a condition
precedent to the applying of irrigation water on the
5000 acres of ne'v lands. The acreage presently irrigated by respondents totals approximately 14,000 acres,
of 'vhich acreage they contend 10,000 are waterlogged.
But they say that the way to cure the situation is to give
them more water and they will actually use less. This
Court can readily determine from its own experience
concerning water and water rights that this is contrary
to all human experience, for the reason that if a water
user is ever awarded additional water, he will try in
some manner to make use of it.
This cannot be more clearly demonstated than in
the present instance. The Morse Decree (Def. Ex. 51),
placed all the primary rights from the Vermillion Dam
near Richfield to the headwaters of the river in a single
section and all the primary rights were pro-rated. In
the discussions leading up to the signing of the stipulation on which the Cox Decree is based the primary users
in Piute and Garfield Counties convinced the primary
users in Sevier County that if the users in Piute and
Garfield Counties were no longer required to prorate
with the primary users in Sevier County that the Sevier
County users would actually receive a larger total
quantity of water. The reason that since the users in
Piute and Garfield Counties would get a much greater
quantity of water during the summer months they would
no longer use the large quantity of water in the n1onths
of April and May when they had little, if any, use of the
water and which 'vater would then go to the primary
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users in Sevier County who could store this water in the
Piute Reservoir and all would then be benefited. It was
therefore stipulated between the. parties that the primary users in Piute and Garfield Counties would be
placed in independent sections of .fhe river and were no
longer required to prorate t~eir primary rights with
the users in Sevier County. This stipulation was incorporated into the Cox Decree. The fact that the primary
users then received a much greater quantity of water in
the summer months did.not change their irrigation practices in the slightest (Trans. 1025). ·The result of this
increased irrigation ~s: Jhat there are now 10,000 acres
of waterlogged lands, none of which were waterlogged
in 1925. (Def. Ex. 53). Once again respondents are asking the appellants and the co-qrt to grant them additional
water and using the argument "give us more water and
we will actually use l~ss.'.' From past experience
respondents know that if they are given more water that
they will use it regardless of the consequences; and
knowing that. they cannot use more water on their
present .lands without making a duck pond out of 1nost
of it, they take the precaution of asking that they be
permitted to us~ this additional water on 5000 acres of
raw sagebrush land never before irrigated by then1 from
their present water rights.
.

.

2. POSSIBLE SAVINGS OF WATER BY DRAINAGE
OF WATERLOGGED LANDS IS NOT PROPERLY IN ISSUE
IN THIS CASE.

If the respondents had filed 'vith the State Engineer
an application such as that contemplated by Sec. 73~3-20,
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U.C.A. 1953, to exchange certain of their waters, or by

Sec. 73-3-23, U.C.A. 1953, for replacement of waters, and
which type of applications are sometimes commonly
called "'savings" applications under which they would
propose to drain their m·eadow or so called waterlogge<l,
lands, and claim the right to store and use the water thus
saved then the fea~ibility of the project would be inquired into by the State Engineer, and these appellants
would have the right to protelt such application if they
felt their rights were in jeopardy or would be adversely
affected. The respondents would, by such procedure,
commit themselves to a definite program, not only as
to the specified lands to be drained and the method and
extent of the drainage, but would assert the amount of
water which it was estimated could be saved; and upon
approval of such application, if the project appeared to
have merit, they would be required to complete tlie project as set forth in their application, but would be limited
to the amount of water thus saved. Upon the filing of
such application, every lower user would have the opportuntiy to make adequate and proper investigation as to
whether his vested rights would be adversely or injuriously affected, and in event of a protest the State Engineer, and later the court, would have this precise question presented and determined. However, instead of
proceeding in the proper manner, the respondents have
chosen to make the claim, for the first time in the tria~
of this case, that they "could''-not "would"-drain their
meadow lands and thus by elimination of evaporation,
save considerable water. There was no such claim made,
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or even intimated, in their change applications as filed
'vith the State Engineer, or in the hearings before the
State Engineer, or in their pleadings; and appellants
were not afforded any reasonable opportunity to evaluate the situation or meet the issue. It is quite significant
that even in the trial of the cause, when respondents had
Dr. Israelson testify to this matter of "drainage" and
"evaporation," they very studiously avoided any cominitments as to a p'resent intention to either initiate or conlplete such drainage program. It is significant also that
the decree fails to require any saving of water.
On page 55 of respondents brief, appellants are
accused of misstating the acreage irrigated by respondents. The claim is made that our figures are taken fron1
infor1nation which is more than thirty years out of date.
Our inforn1at.ion is taken fron1 respondents ov.rn applications No. a-2328, a-2329, a-2330, a-2331, a-233:2, n-:2~13:3,
a-2334, a-2377, a-23'78, a-2379, a-2381, a-2382, a-2394,
a-2395, a-2396, a-2407 and a-2408 which are the original
ehange applications involved in this action and which
'vere filed in the office of the State Engineer bet\veen
Sept. 14, 1948, and Sept. 14, 1949, and which \\'ere corrected on ~-,eb. 5, 1949. These applications are in evidenee
before this Court as 1Jlaintiff's Exhibit 1. Re~pondent~
listed their acreage in detail and 've 1nerely took their
figures for it, which, until sho\vn to the contrary, can he
assumed to be correct. These applications reporh)dly
list all of the lands then irrigated by respondents and
total approxi1nately 14,000 acres. They say that we bnve
contradicted this evidence by introducing Defendant~'
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Ex. 54, which at page 11 thereof shows that the irrigated
acreage in Garfield and Piute Counties aggregates about
24,600 acres, and consequently appellants' evidence shows
10,600 more acres of irrigated lands than is admitted in
appellants' brief. What respondents fail to take into
consideration is that the brief and page 11 of defendants'
Ex. 54, are talking about two entirely different matters.
In the brief is listed acreage presently irrigated by
respondents. Page 11, Ex. 54, is talking of the total irrigated acreage in the two counties of Garfield and Piute.
We are not at all concerned with the total acreage irrigated in the two counties. We are concerned only with
the lands irrigated by respondents.
On page 56 of their brief, respondents state:
"It is significant that as a rule plaintiffs do
not have allotted to them the full amount of their
decreed primary rights because of insufficient
flow of the river."
It was stated on the same page of their brief:
"When primary rights and second class
rights are combined, the acreage "\vatered per second foot cannot be said to show an excessive
a\vard of water, nor to imply any duty to provide
a 'substantial return flow' to the river."
To substantiate this statement they cite the examples of the East Panguitch Irrigation Company, East
Bench Irrigation Company and Long Canal Company.
Let us see how this statement stands up against the
record. Page 15, Defendants' Ex. 4 shows that for ten
years out of fifteen years, between 1935 and 1950, these

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

32

companies received 100% of their primary flow for the
entire season and that for those ten years they also
received substantial quantities of water under their second and third class rights. F·or the other five years they
received not less than 90o/o-or more than 95% of their
primary rights for the entire season, and that in addition, except for the years 1939 a~d 1950, they received
a substantial quantity of water in addition from their
second and third class rights. It will be ~bserved fron1
page 15 of Ex. 4, that 1950 is the second driest year on
record insofar as Panguitch Valley is concerned.
The Long and East J3ench Canal Companies have
a common diversion point and the combined acreage of
the two companies amounts to 2460.5 acres. Page 54 of
Plaintiff's Ex. 4 shows the daily diversion into the joint
canal for the year 1950, which as stated before is the
second driest year out of the fifteen year period next
preceding. This record shows that there was diverted
into this joint canal 17,190 acre feet of water for the
irrigation of 2460.5 acres which amounts to 6.98 acre
feet of water per acre, assuming that the entire acreage
was irrigated that year. It is also significant to note
that of this large quantity of water diverted, only 680
acre feet of water were diverted during the entire 1nonths
of January, February and December of that year. It
will be noted also that approximately 0.9 of an acre foot
of water per acre per month was diverted for each of
the months of April, May, June, July, August and October, or a total of 5.4 acre feet during those months. ThiR
is certainly a liberal supply of water during the growing
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season and far more than any known plant could utilize.
If the 13,000 acre feet which is proposed to be stored
in respondents' reservoir were ~pplied to the lands
presently being irrigated by respondent companies during the 60-day period July 1st to August 31st, it would
amount to 108 cubic feet per second for the 60 days or
an additional one acre foot per acre.
We assert that the usual, customary and normal duty
of water throughout Utah, as recognized by the State
Engineer in years past is three acre feet per acre for
each irrigation ·season. There is no evidence in the record sho,ving this fact but this Court has repeatedly held
that the records of the State Engineer's O~fice are public
records and it may, therefore, take judicial notice of the
contents thereof. (McGarry v. Thompson, 114 Utah 442,
201 P. 2nd 288; Lehigh Irrigation Company v. Jones,
115 Utah 136, 202 P. 2nd 895; American Fork Irrigation
Company v. Linke, (Utah 1951), 239 P. 2nd 189.) The
records of the State Engineer's Office will show that
unless some extraordinary condition exists, the certificates of appropriation he has in the past and now issues
contain a limitation of three acre feet per acre per irrigation season, and that such amount is considered a
reasonable duty. We mention this to show that in the
year 1950, the second driest year in the 15-year period
between 1935 and 1950, the canal companies in question
received 6.98 acre feet of water per acre, or more water
than twice the normal amount of what is considered a
reasonable duty.
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In numerous places in their brief (7, 20, 31, 46, and
other places) ,respondents refer to "disaster" water. We
assume they are referring to water which they cannot
hold because of floods, broken canal banks and the like,
and indicate that the respondents have no right to such
water notwithstanding it all goes to make up the flow of
the stream from time to time. They argue that notwithstanding they have a right to prevent breaks in the
canals and to put controls in the channel to prevent
flooding of their lands and thus prevent such "disaster"
water from reaching the reservoirs, they have a vested
right to such waters to the extent of storing the same
even though their award was a direct flow right. At the
time the decree was written, it was certainly known by
all par~ies that there would be such things as flash
floods, flooding of lands after cloudbursts, broken canal
banks, rain storms when water from the river would
not be needed; and in the light of such conditions no
right was asked for, by, or awarded to the respondent~'
to store such waters for future use, but the storage
companies were awarded all waters not used by primary
direct flow users
Respondents cite the case of 81nithjield West
Bench Irr. Co. vs. Union Ce·ntral Life In-s. Co., 105
Utah 468, 142 Pac. 2nd 866, (see page 140 respondents'
brief) as authority for their position that the granting
of all their applications as set forth in the Jones <lecree
is no enlargement of their rights. They assert "The
case also holds that the appropriator may also put his
appropriated water into a reservoir, or lease or sell the
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water.'" We submit that the case does not uphold such
assertion insofar as the same 'vould apply to the case
at bar. The only statement in the opinion in that matter
is found at page 867 of 142 Pac. 2nd, where it is said:
HAs long as 'vater is under control of appropriator o·n. his land or in hi.s ditches or reservoirs
owned or controlled by him it is still his water
and he n1ay use it in any lawful place or for any
la,vful use he chooses, or may lease it or sell it."
This statement is made in the light of the factual
situation then before the court. The court said:
"The nub of the controversy is-has either
party shown it has a right as against the other
to the use of the water coming through Logan
Korthern Canal, and what rights can be acquired
in such water."
There is no discussion in the Smithfield case as to
any different type or kind of irrigation, or at a period
of time other than that for which the water was awarded,
or change from direct flow to storage, nor was there
before the court or considered, the statutory provision
that a change such as respondents are making must be
under change applications and under a showing that the
change can be effected without injury or impairing the
rights of others.
At page 138 of respondents' brief, it is argued that
an application to convert a portion of a direct flow right
to a storage right does not constitute an enlargement of
the right, for it does not amount to an application to
appropriate more water. Under certain circumstances
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that may be true. But not under the circumstances
attendant in the instant cause, where respondents want
to store a part of their direct flow winter rights, not
needed or used in the winter months, to irrigate 5,000
additional acres in the summer, and to continue to use
their summer rights to irrigate all of their previously
irrigated lands. Respondents cite as authority for their
claimed right the case of Gunnison Irr. Co. vs. Gunnison
Highland Canal Co., 52 Utah 347, 174 Pac. 852. Tllis
case is in reality authority for the .appellants' position.
A reading of the case shows that respondents did not
quote fully fro1n the· opinion. They did not finish the
quotation referred to in their brief, and which balance
of the quotation is as follows:
"But it is well settled and entirely elernentary
that all changes in the 1node of enjoyn1ent n1ust
in no event Yiolate the 1naxiln 'Sic utere tuo ut
alienu1n non laedas'. That qualification is plainly
set forth in Seven Lakes Res. vs Ne'v Loveland
& Greeley Irr. and Land Co., cited supra, wherP
at page 486 of 93 f>ac. and page 331 of 17 L.H.A.
(N.S.) Gabbert, J., in delivering the opinion of
the court said : 'A Priority to the use of water is
a property right, 'vhich is subject to purchase and
sale and its character and method of use 1nay ht:>
changed, provided such change does not injuriously affect the rights of others. (Italics set forth
in opinion.)
On page 855 of 17 4 Pac. ( Chtnnison case above
referred to), it is said :
"In short the rights of a prior appropriator
are 1neasured and li1nited to the extent of hi~
appropriation and application to a henefieinl use.
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If he diverts 1nore water than under this doctrine
he is entitled to, he must return such surplus to
the strerun for the use of subsequent appropriators. No extension or enlargement of his ·rights
as determined by the doctrine of beneficial use
can be n1ade so as to interfere with the vested
rights of others."
In the Seven Lakes case, cited above, 93 Pac. at
page 487, appears the following statement in addition to
the quotation which appears in respondents' brief. It is
pertinent to the problem in the case at bar.
"It is contended by counsel that the decision
in this case is contrary to New Loveland &
Greeley I. &.L. Co. vs Consolidated Home Supply
Ditch Co. 62 Pac. 366, 52 L.R.A. 266, and Fort
Lyon Canal Co. vs Chew, 81 Pac. 37. In the New
Loveland ease it 'vas determined that the appropriation of water for irrigation of lands during
the irrigation season gave the appropriator no
priority of right to store water during the nonirrigating season for future use. This does not
conflict with the opinion in case at bar. No right
to store water during the non-irrigating season
is conferred." (E1nphasis added.)
The Seven Lakes case relied on by respondents can
readily be distinguished from the case at bar, both in
fact and in legal principle involved. In the Seven Lakes
case the appellant owned certain rights to the use of
water which had previously been applied to the irrigation of lands. Instead of continuing to so use this water
it ceased its direct application in the early part of the
irrigation season and stored the water for use later
in the same irrigation season, but storage did not involve
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winter water, nor storage at any time other than that
when water was previously applied by direct diversion
from the stream. On the rehearing the court said: (page
487, 93 Pac.)
"It must be borne in mind that this decision
is based upon the fact, which is undisputed, that
the stockholders of appellant are gro,ving crops
which do not, from their nature, require irrigation during the early part of the season, but do
later, and that they desire to utilize the water in
controversy for that purpose. Based upon these
facts we have declared what has tin1e and tilne
again been decided by this court, that the character and method of use of a priority to the use of
water may be changed, provided such change does
not injuriously affect the rights of others, and
that appellant is entitled to divert and store the
water represented by the priorities purchased
for the use of its stockholders for application to
crops later, but in no greater quantity anrl at uo
other or different time than could be di,t·erted
and applied to land directly to nourish l'TO}JS
t~equiring irriga.tion at the time of such diversion;
or otherwise expressed, appellant is per1nitted to
divert and store the water in controversy, but
this right is measured and fixed by the liinitations which the law would i1npose upon its usc for
diversion and application to crops requiring irrigation at the time of such diversion. ****** This
does not enlarge the use of the priorities of apellant, either in .time or quantity; neither does it
confer upon it the right to divert and store the
water represented by its prioritie~ every day
during the irrigation season or to convert such
priorities into a storage right during the nonirrigating season, but lin1its its rights strictly to
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the diversion of water, both as to volume and
time, to the same quantity and the same time we
have indicated."
\V e think the case of New Lovelarnd and Greeley
Irr-igation and Land' Co. vs. Consolidated Home-Supply
Ditch and Res. Co., 62 Pac. 366, (Colo.) is almost directly
in point \\Tith the problen1 no\v under discussion. The facts
in the above case are these: The plaintiff was awarded
a priority of right senior to that awarded the defendants who use ditches as· a feeder for its reservoirs. The
plaintiff's right \vas predicated upon a direct flow or
ditch right, \\Thich it afterwards wanted to convert into
a storage right. Plaintiff urged that its appropriations
and for which it received its decreed priority were
appropriations made for agricultural purposes, regardless of the Inethod or the time of use; that is to say,
plaintiff claimed the right to employ its decreed appropriations in the most effective and economical manner,
either by i1nmediate use in the irrigation of lands or
by storage of water during the non-irrigating season
and at other times when water is to be obtained froin
the river, to be used by it thereafter during the irrigating season. (This is precisely what the appellants are
now contending for). On the other hand the defendant
con tended that under the statutes of the state, as well
as the general law relating to the subject of appropriation, the right of storing water in reservoirs is one
thing and the right of diverting water for immediate use
in irrigating lands is another and distinct thing, and
neither necessarily depends upon or is connected with
the other.
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The CQurt said (page 367, 62 Pac.):
"Much discussion is indulged in by counsel
over the terms 'dir~ct' and 'indireet' irrigation,
plaintiff maintaining that in the system of irrigation law there is no valid difference while
defendant dwells with some force upon ·a distinction supposed to exist between the two methods of use and the law applicable. *••••• (Quoting from the concluding sentence of the opinion)
-while the statutes of this state contemplate that
one may, by complying with their provisions,
acquire and have decreed to him a priority of
right for storing water in reservoirs, it is also
clearly their design that this right shall not be
dependent upon, or measured by a right which he
may have to a decree for his ditch of a priority
for diverting water for immediate irrigation, tho
the ditch may, in addition to being used as avehicle for carrying water for :llruuediate use, be also
utilized at some· time as a feeder for the reservoir."

Respondents assert in their brief on page 140 "This
court has also approved the practice of 'vinter irrigation, not only in Richlands Irr. Co. vs. Westview Irr.
Co., et al., 96 Utah 403, 80 Pac. 2nd, 458, but also in
Lawson vs. McBride, 71 Utah 239, 264 Pac. 727." In the
Lawson case cited above nothing is said about 'vinter
water, but the opinion states that during the highwater
season water may be used to soak up ground.
As to the use of winter water, the correct rule, we
believe, is that set forth in the case of Hardy vs. Beaver
County Irrigation Co., 65 Utah 28, 234 Pac. 524, at page
529 (4), to the effect that an appropriation of 'vater is
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limited by time as well as by amount; in other words,
that an appropriator's right is limited by the quantity of
water which he has beneficially used and the seasonal
period during which he has used the same. The Hardy
case· holds that an appropriator's right must be limited
to the ainount of water he can use beneficially during
the period of the year when he has actually been accustomed to use the same.
3. THE QUANTITY OF WATER BEING TAKEN FROM
APPELLANTS IS LARGE IN AMOUNT AND APPELLANTS
WILL BE SERIOUSLY HURT BY SUCH TAKING.

Respondents contend also that they should be per- .
mitted to construct a reservoir and impound the waters
therein upon the ground that the amount proposed to be
stored is so small in relation to the total storage on the
Sevier River, that no one can possibly be harmed. This
contention is made at pages 10 and 25 of their brief.
In effect they state you can destroy a 1nan without injuring him if you do it a little at a time. Their statement
is correct that the storage capacity of the reservoir at
Hatch would only equal 4.5·% of the available storage
capacity in the Piute and Sevier Bridge Reservoirs, but
the statement is greatly misleading, for it is not the
capacity of the reservoir that is imp·ortant, but the
amount of water actually available for storage therein.
It is clearly shown by the record covering a long period
of tin1e (Deft's Ex. 4, page 25) and by the testimony of
W. C. Cole (trans. page 489), that the average amount of
water impounded in the Sevier Bridge Reservoir annually from the period 1915 to · 1950 is only approxi-
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mately 160,000 acre feet and that the water proposed to
be stored in the Hatchtown Reservoir is approximately
8.75% of the annual storage of the. Sevier Bridge Reservoir. D·efendant's Ex. 4, on page 25 also shows that for
the year 1935 the water proposed to be stored in Hatchtown Reservoir would approximate 33¥3% of the total
amount of water stored in the Piute and the Sevier
Bridge Reservoirs combined. The only correct comparison is not in capacity of the respective reservoirs
but in the available water for storage therein. The record (Pltf's Ex. G) shows that there is always sufficient
water at Kingston to fill the proposed reservoir. The
record therefore discloses that if the proposed reservoir
were allowed to be constructed and water stored therein
which has otherwise been stored in the Piute Reservoir,
that in an average year it would deprive the lower users
of a substantial amount of the water 'vhich they have
been otherwise receiving, and in the dry years such a.s
1935, of an amount equal to approximately one third of
the available water. But this would not be the only
result, since there are numerous other reservoir sites
along the Sevier River above the Piute Reservoir at
which sites reservoirs could be constructed and 'vater
impounded therein to the extent of depriving the owners
of the Piute and Sevier Bridge Reservoirs of practically
all of the water which is now impounded therein. (R.
1110; see page 63 of appellants' opening brief).
Reference is made in respondents' brief (page 90)
to a provision in the Cox Decree at page 11 giving to
Panguitch Land and Livestock Company "sufficient of
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the waters on the South Fork of the Sevier River to fill
its reservoir as the same is to be constructed near Asay,
Garfield County, according to present plans and specification." Respondents then argue that because of such
a'vard the Cox Decree clearly contemplated the con.struction in the future of a reservoir, and therefore it follows
that this decree gives respondents the right to store their
direct flow rights in a reservoir at the approximate site
of the reservoir above mentioned.
As stated by respondents "the question of storage
under said fourth class rights is not in issue here." Just
why the award appears in the Cox Decree is not clear.
It was agreed between counsel, and submitted to the
trial court, that plaintiffs did not claim any rights under
that award.
Quoting from page 5 of the Record (Reporter's
Transcript) :
"THE COURT: You're not asking for any
rights under that particular paragraph in the
Cox Decree which says a right to construct a
reservoir in Asay Canyon; you're not relying on
that~

MR. BUR.TON: That isn't in these applications at all.
MR. CLINE : Is it in this

suit~

MR. BURTON: No."
As a matter of fact one of the 'vitnesses, Nels L.
Peterson, testified that this award was permitted to get
into the decree because the Piute Reservoir owners were
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under the impression that the rights belonged to Piute,
and if Piute was to construct the reservoir then Sevier
Bridge would be mutually interested ·and it 1night be an
advantage to Sevier Bridge and Piute to store part of
their water in such reservoir and let it down as needed.
( R. 855 to 858). Because it was agreed the plaintiff~
would claim no rights under that award the defendant~
did not introduce any evidence showing how the Panguitch Land and Irrigation Company right \Vas initiated,
whether it had lapsed, what was done with it, of \Vhat
the fourth class right might consist and \vhether the
right was a consu1nptive or non-consumptive use. Futhermore, respondents are not the successors to any suc.h
rights and there is not privity between respondents and
Panguitch Land & Irr. Co. It seen1s idle for the respo~d
ents to urge that they haYe acquired the right to ~tore
their direct flo\v prin1ary rights because the Cox Decree
provided for storage of some fourth class rights. The
award to the Panguitch Land and Livestock Con1pany i~
completely foreign to the issues in the case at har, and
neither adds nor detracts fron1 the position of Pither
respondents or appellants. We mention the matter only
because respondents stress the fact that by this award
there is an implication in the decree looking for\vard to
the time when they should likewise have the right to
build a reservoir and convert their direct flow \vinter
rights into storage for either the follo\ving irrigation
season, or for that n1atter, to be held over until a year
later.

'Ve call attention to thP faet that the applications for
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such storage do not require a release of the stored water
during the following irrigation season, but respondents
could hold over a portion until a second or third irrigation season. The decree does not require the respondents
to release the entire amount of storage in any one year.

It should be borne in mind that even if water was
stored under the Panguitch Land and Livestock Company right as set forth in the decree, and assuming such
storage deprived the lower storage companies of a substantial quantity of water, such use would have commenced many years ago and before the water users
taking water from storage had invested large sums in
developing farms, building homes thereon and otherwise making expensive improvements in reliance of
sufficient water for such purposes.
CONCLUSION
Those members of the Court who visited the Millard
County and Sevier and Sanpete Valley areas must
appreciate the disastrous ·effect that the irrigation of
5,000 acres in Panguitch Valley would have upon the
lower users. They observed that all of the waters of the
river are being consumed for agricultural purposes and
they were able to see for themselves that this is not a
case where there are excess waters which would otherwise be wasted. The thousands of acres in Millard
County and under the Piute project which many years
ago had been cleared and farmed and then abandoned
for lack of water are the best evidence of the disaster
'vhich would fall to the appellant companies if the
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respondents succeed in this proceeding. The respondents' attempt to appropriate additional water never
before needed or ·used by them is an obvious invasion of
the vested rights of the appellants. For 17 years under
the General Adjudication Decree the River Commissioners have adn1inistered the water of the Sevier Ri Yer
in an efficient, careful and fair manner with the result
that all of the waters of the river have been placed to
a beneficial use and homes and farms have been established relying upon the delivery of such water. For more
than 17 years under this administration there has been
quiet and peace on the river because all parties fully
understood the stipulation and its purposes upon which
the General Adjudication Decree was based. Respondents justify their atten1pt to utilize storage in the proposed Hatchtown Reservoir because of what they eall
"progress." If this Court was concerned only 'vith
progress for the benefit of respondents, the position of
respondents might be sustained.· Ho,vever, respondent~
are not entitled to progress solely at the expense of and
without regard to the rights of the lower users.
The State Engineer's decision in rejecting the respondents' applications should be reinstated and the decree of
the Trial Court reversed.
"Respectfully subrnitted,
E. R. CALLISTER,
Attorney General
JOHN W. HORSLEY,
Assistant Attorney General
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ROBERT B. PORTER,
Assistant Attorney General
(Attorneys for State Engineer)
NEPHI J. BATES,
C. W. WILKINS,
RICHARD H. NEBEKER,
(Attorneys for Piute Reservoir and
Irrigation Company)
DUDLEY CRAFTS,
SAM CLINE,
(Attorneys for Deseret Irrigation
Company, Melville Irrigation Co.,
Delta Canal Co., Central Utah
Water Company and Abraham Irrigation Company)
FERDINAND ERICKSON,
C. W. WILKINS,
(Attorneys for Richfield Irrigation
and Canal Company, Annabella Irrigation Canal Company, Elsinore
Canal Company, Brooklyn ·Canal
Company, Monroe Irrigation Company, Wells Irrigation Company,
Joseph Irrigation Company, Sevier Valley Canal Company, Vermillion Irrigation Company, and
Monroe South Bend Canal Company)
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